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Performance measures and short-termism: 
an exploratory study 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We examine the relationship between performance measurement systems 
and short-termism. Hypotheses are tested on a sample of senior managers 
drawn from a major telecommunications company to determine the extent to 
which the diagnostic and interactive uses of financial and non-financial 
measures give rise to short-termism. We find no evidence to suggest that the 
use of financial measures, either diagnostically or interactively, leads to short-
term behaviour. In contrast, we find a significant association between the use 
of non-financial measures and short-termism. Results suggest that the 
diagnostic use of non-financial measures leads managers to make inter-
temporal trade-off choices that prioritise the short term to the detriment of the 
long term, while we find interactive use is negatively associated with short-
termism. We find an imbalance in favour of the diagnostic use over the 
interactive use of non-financial performance measures is associated with 
short-termism. Overall, findings highlight the importance of considering the 
specific use of performance measures in determining the causes of short-
termism. 
 
Keywords: financial measures, non-financial measures, diagnostic control, 
interactive control, short-termism.
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Performance measures and short-termism: 
an exploratory study 
 
1. Introduction 
It is a well established orthodoxy that financial measures such as profit and 
return on capital employed encourage short-termism (see for example: Hayes 
and Abernathy, 1980; Kaplan, 1984; Johnson and Kaplan, 1987; Ittner, 
Larcker and Randall, 2003; Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007).  Merchant 
and Van der Stede (2007: 452-3), for instance, assert that, ‘Management 
myopia, an excessive focus on short-term performance, is an almost 
inevitable side-effect of the use of financial results control systems built on 
accounting measures of performance’. A major response to this proposition 
has been to recommend the introduction of additional, non-financial 
measures, which include customer satisfaction, quality and staff attitude (see, 
for instance, Ittner and Larcker, 1998; Sliwka, 2002). This recommendation is 
based upon the proposition that future orientated non-financial measures 
overcome the short-term orientation encouraged by backward looking 
financial measures (Ittner, Larcker and Meyer, 2003; Merchant and Van der 
Stede, 2007). Despite the intuitive appeal of these two propositions, there is 
surprisingly little supporting empirical evidence. Our aim in this study is to 
address this lacuna. Specifically, we explore (1) the orthodoxy that financial 
measures encourage short-termism and (2) the view that short-termism can 
be overcome by using non-financial measures. 
 
Financial and non-financial performance measurement plays an important role 
in management control systems generally (Otley, 1999; Bhimani and 
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Langfield-Smith, 2007); and, more particularly,  it has been suggested that 
‘virtually all writing on management control systems refers to diagnostic 
control systems’ (Simons, 1995: 60). A more precise statement of the 
proposition that begins this paper might therefore be stated in terms of the 
impact of the diagnostic use of financial measures upon short-termism. The 
diagnostic use of performance measures (to monitor performance against pre-
set standards) can be contrasted with interactive use (to encourage dialogue 
about strategic uncertainties). These two ways of using performance 
measures have been shown to be central to management control within a 
broader framework which incorporates beliefs systems (the core values and 
direction of the firm as set out in mission statements, credos and statements 
of purpose) and boundary systems (rules that establish constraints and define 
acceptable activities) (Simons, 1995; 2000; see Widener, 2007 for a review).  
 
Prior studies have shown that behavioural and organizational impacts of 
performance measures may vary according to diagnostic use, interactive use 
or through a combination of diagnostic and interactive use (Bisbe and Otley, 
2004; Henri, 2006). Our study of short-termism therefore concentrates on how 
diagnostic and interactive uses of financial and non-financial measures affect 
short-termism. The distinction between interactive and diagnostic use is a new 
departure for studies of short-termism, since prior research makes no 
distinction between what Simons (1995; 2000) argues are the two key roles 
for organizationally based performance measures. 
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Our findings suggest that financial measures may have no impact on short-
termism irrespective of the manner of their use. These findings support other 
studies that have failed to find a relationship between financial measures and 
short-termism (e.g. Van der Stede, 2000; Marginson and McAulay, 2008). In 
terms of the role played by non-financial measures in overcoming short-
termism, our study suggests that non-financial measures used diagnostically 
may be associated with short-termism, while the interactive use of non-
financial measures may be negatively associated with short-termism. Short-
termism is also evident where diagnostic use exceeds interactive use of non-
financial measures.  
 
The paper makes two contributions. The first is to challenge the enduring 
orthodoxy that financial performance measures are responsible for short-
termism. The unquestioned assumption in the literature is that type of 
measure (financial versus non-financial) may be of prime importance in 
shaping managerial short-termism. Our findings challenge this assumption, 
and we advise that consideration should additionally be given to the specific 
ways performance measures are used. The second contribution is thus to 
suggest that, where performance measurement systems create short-
termism, the diagnostic or interactive use of the systems may influence inter-
temporal trade-off decisions. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section reviews the 
literature. The literature review begins by discussing the nature of short-
termism and then considers performance measurement systems and the 
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claims that have been made for their effect on short-termism. Section three 
develops hypotheses by extending the literature review to consider specific 
arguments relating to the diagnostic and interactive uses of financial and non-
financial measures. Sections four and five describe the research method and 
instruments, Section six presents the results of our analysis and Section 
seven presents the discussion and conclusions. 
 
2. Short-termism and performance measurement systems 
‘Short-termism’ is generally used interchangeably with ‘myopia’ to denote a 
temporal orientation that prioritises the near term over the longer term. Myopia 
and short-termism can be defined as a cognitive limitation that affects 
decision-making (see Miller, 2002). Alternatively, myopia and short-termism 
can be defined in terms of disposition. Samuel (2000: 494), for instance, 
defines shareholder myopia as ‘the tendency of shareholders to focus on the 
behaviour of stock prices in the short term as opposed to the long term’ (italics 
introduced by the authors). Similarly, a longstanding practice of measuring 
short-termism, based upon a variable that assesses the time managers spend 
on issues that will appear in the profit and loss statement within a specified 
period of time (see Otley, 1978; Merchant, 1990; Van der Stede, 2000), is 
consistent with a dispositional view. The underlying assumption appears to be 
that performance measures influence disposition; and that managers 
subjected to control based upon performance measures may, as a 
consequence, be disposed to engage in short-termism1. 
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‘Short-termism’ and ‘short-term’ are related but distinguishable terms. The 
short-term is commonly viewed as a one-year orientation normally consistent 
with the budgeting cycle (Van der Stede, 2000: 611). The short-term must be 
distinguished from short-termism because it is not necessarily 
disadvantageous to take actions that are beneficial within a one-year period. 
The experience of financial adversity, for instance, may necessitate decisive 
short-term actions to ensure long-term survival (Ittner, Larcker and Rajan, 
1997: 235; Van der Stede, 2000). A definition of short-termism must therefore 
be viewed not just in terms of the prioritisation of the short-term, but as actions 
taken in the short-term which damage the long-term effectiveness of the firm 
and hence its value (e.g. Merchant, 1990: 299; Laverty, 1996: 826; Van der 
Stede, 2000: 609-610; Bhojraj and Libby, 2005: 1). The emphasis here is not 
on cognitive constraints or dispositions, nor on the need for managers to act in 
the short term, but on the inter-temporal trade-off involved in actions taken to 
improve reported current performance to the detriment of long-term value. 
 
The introduction stated that there is surprisingly little empirical evidence to 
support an association between short-termism and financial performance 
measures. Nevertheless, there is limited support for this relationship. 
Merchant (1990: 307-8; 311), for instance, found a short-term orientation that  
‘was positively associated with the felt impact of financial controls’. There is 
also limited empirical evidence to support the corollary that managers who 
avoid a sole reliance upon accounting performance measures may adopt a 
more long-term orientation. Building upon the modelling of the short-term 
effects of budget use proposed by Hopwood (1972), Otley (1978) reported 
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that managers who adopted a mixed evaluation style that balanced budget 
and efficiency criteria2 ‘tended to spend a greater proportion of their time on 
long-term planning’ (pg. 131). 
 
Yet, there is also evidence to suggest that financial measures may be used to 
support a long-term view (Bhimani and Langfield-Smith, 2007), or that 
financial measures may have no effect on managers’ time preferences. Van 
der Stede (2000: 619) found no support for a direct effect of financial 
measures on short-termism and reported that ‘the budgetary control style 
does not directly affect the business unit managers’ time-orientation’. In place 
of a direct effect, the association between financial measures and short-
termism may be indirect. Van der Stede (2000: 619) found a set of 
relationships through which poor past performance led to the use of more rigid 
controls and reduced slack thereby causing short-termism. Additionally, in a 
study of US and Japanese managers, Chow, Kato and Merchant (1996) show 
that culture may mitigate the effects of financial control systems.  
 
Extant research is therefore inconclusive with regard to the role played by 
financial measures in causing short-termism. The mixed results might be 
explained in at least two ways. The first explanation centres on the use of 
proxies to measure short-termism. Two measures of short-term orientation 
have traditionally been adopted. The first uses Lawrence and Lorsch’s (1967) 
instrument which asks managers to assess the percentage of time devoted to 
working on issues that would impact the profit and loss statement within 
specified time periods. The second measure, adopted by Merchant (1990), is 
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based upon a variable that measures the discouragement of new ideas, as 
represented by the effect of financial controls on expenditure for a range of 
discretionary items. Merchant (1990) adopted both measures and reported 
different results, with a strong statistical association being reported for the 
relationship between financial control and the measure of discouragement of 
new ideas; whilst the results based upon the Lawrence and Lorsch measure 
were ‘barely statistically significant’ (pp. 307-8). These different results for the 
different proxies may suggest the possibility that the proxies are measuring 
different phenomena. The Lawrence and Lorsch measure in particular 
appears to address respondents’ attitudes towards the short-term without 
necessarily considering actions which entail an inter-temporal tradeoff; and 
short-termism in general has proved to be difficult to measure with any 
precision (Laverty, 1996). 
 
More recent measures of short-termism have either adapted existing proxies 
or have adopted a more direct measure of short-termism. For example, Gibbs, 
Merchant, Van der Stede and Vargus (2004) used two separate single item 
measures to assess different aspects of short-termism: (1) the extent to which 
formula-based performance measurement system encouraged managers to 
focus on the short-term; and (2) the amount spent on training3. Alternatively, 
Marginson and McAulay (2008) developed an instrument that asked 
managers to reveal the extent to which they were prepared to sacrifice long 
term benefits in order to meet short-term performance targets. This instrument 
provides the most direct attempt to operationalise short-termism as an inter-
temporal trade-off in favour of the short-term. 
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 The second possible explanation for the mixed results reported above is that 
existing studies investigate the relationship between the importance attached 
to financial measures and short-termism without differentiating among the 
alternative roles that accounting based controls may play within the firm. The 
roles of performance measures are diverse. They include: creating a basis for 
dialogue, legitimating and rationalising action (Burchell, Clubb, Hopwood, 
Hughes and Nahapiet 1980); scorekeeping, attention directing and problem 
solving (Simon, Guetzkow, Kozmetsky and Tyndall, 1954; Vandenbosch, 
1999); enabling strategic change (Abernethy and Brownell, 1999; Bisbe and 
Otley, 2004; Henri, 2006); and the roles of diagnostic and interactive control 
(Simons, 1995; 2000). This latter approach emphasises the importance of the 
ways in which performance measures are used. Placing use at the centre of 
the question of the causes of short-termism, as contrasted with a long-term 
orientation and strategy, is consistent with Simons’ (1990: 127) longstanding 
research agenda, which has asked, ‘how do top managers actually use 
planning and control systems to assist in the achievement of organizational 
goals?’. The next section develops the relationships between diagnostic and 
interactive use of performance measures and short-termism.  
 
3. Diagnostic and interactive utilisation of performance 
measures  
This section begins by outlining the nature of diagnostic control. It then 
develops arguments, based upon an extensive literature, that explain how the 
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diagnostic use of performance measures can be linked to short-termism. The 
arguments lead to hypotheses which are presented at the end of the section. 
 
3.1 Diagnostic utilisation of performance measures and short-termism 
Diagnostic control provides direction and motivation for goal achievement 
through a focus on monitoring progress against key performance indicators or 
‘critical performance variables’ (i.e. those factors enabling the achievement of 
intended strategy – Henri, 2006, p.5; Simons, 2005).This type of control is a 
form of learning that entails single loop feedback through which deviations 
from pre-set standards of performance are corrected (Simons, 1995; Argyris, 
1999; Otley, 1999; Vandenbosch, 1999, Henri, 2006). Diagnostic control 
thereby facilitates management by exception (Widener, 2007). No action is 
taken where results and actions accord to predetermined standards of 
performance; and corrective action is restricted to situations where outcomes 
do not meet expectations (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2007). Although 
diagnostic systems can lead to constructive outcomes, they are also 
associated with negative control where management by exception focuses 
attention on mistakes and negative variances (Henri, 2006).  
 
The potential negative consequences can be explained by elaborating a 
central aspect of Argyris’ (1999) ‘theory of action’, in which organisations and 
individuals take actions to accomplish intended consequences, and learning is 
defined as the detection and correction of mismatches between intentions and 
outcomes. In broad terms, actions may be experienced directly through face-
to-face interactions or indirectly through expectations of the anticipated 
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responses of others (Luckmann, 2008). Where accounting information 
represents an indirect experience, as in the case where diagnostic control is 
an automatic process that supports control-at-a-distance (see Simons, 1995: 
70-1), the kinds of actions that are encouraged by performance measures 
may depend upon expectations of the responses of others, particularly those 
with higher status (Roberts, 1991). Performance measurement systems 
thereby hold implications for the self-esteem that arises from performing 
effectively and individuals tend to act so as to maintain a positive sense of self 
and to avoid feelings of embarrassment, threat, vulnerability or incompetence 
(Argyris, 1999: 135; also see pages 131-3). In order to maintain self-esteem 
and a positive sense of self within a wider community, subordinates may 
pursue actions which send superiors the message superiors appear to want to 
receive or which reflect the subordinates’ actions in the best possible manner 
(Birnberg, Turopolec and Young, 1983; Tetlock, 1992). Actions reported by 
performance measurement systems thereby have implications for the sense 
of self and self esteem which is constructed through the expected responses 
of superiors (Hopwood, 1972; Choudhury, 1986; Roberts, 1991).  
 
In the case of diagnostic control systems, it follows that subordinates may 
sometimes comply with targets or report favourable variances in order to 
maintain self-esteem even where the consequences are detrimental to the 
firm in the longer term. This kind of behaviour is an unintended and 
dysfunctional consequence that has been classified as a form of gaming and 
as a defensive behaviour, which protects self by circumventing 
embarrassment or threats to self-esteem (Hopwood, 1972; Birnberg et al., 
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1983; Argyris, 1990). Gaming is defined as the act of selecting an activity so 
as to achieve a favourable measure of performance ‘at the expense of 
selecting an alternative course of action that would result in a more desirable 
level of performance so far as the superior’s true goal is concerned’ (Birnberg 
et al., 1983: 122). Where the ‘true goal’ is wealth creation in the long term, 
short-termism is a form of gaming; and Birnberg et al. (1983) illustrate their 
definition of gaming through an example which shows how managers can act 
so as to benefit the short-term to the detriment of the long term. 
 
Diagnostic control can be applied to any quantitative, numerically based 
measure(s) which permit(s) the monitoring of performance against pre-set 
standard(s) (Simons, 2005). Both financial and non-financial measures may 
therefore be utilised diagnostically (Simons, 1995). In the specific case of the 
diagnostic use of non-financial measures, the possibility that such measures 
might represent ‘leading’ indicators of performance that draw attention to the 
future (Sliwka, 2002) may become secondary to the consequences of single 
loop feedback and management by exception, in which the focus is on 
conformity and maintaining the status quo (Johnson and Gill, 1993; Argyris, 
1999). This possibility is implicit in Simons’ (1995: 81-84) analysis of the 
potential dysfunctional consequences of diagnostic control systems in which 
he discusses examples drawn from the use of both financial and non-financial 
measures. We therefore hypothesise that: 
 
H1: Increasing diagnostic use of financial performance measures is 
associated with increasing short-termism 
 
H2: Increasing diagnostic use of non-financial performance measures is 
associated with increasing short-termism  
 11
 3.2 Interactive use of performance measures and rejection of short-termism 
Where predictable goal achievement justifies the use of diagnostic control, 
interactive control is designed to encourage creativity and innovation (Simons, 
1995). To this end, interactive control stimulates the development of new 
ideas and initiatives and guides the bottom-up emergence of strategies 
(Simons, 1995; Henri, 2006: 5). The role of senior managers in this case is to 
promote evolution and adaptation, stimulate the emergence of new strategies, 
and encourage subordinates to challenge the status quo and to find new 
solutions to old problems (Roberts, 1991: 366; Simons, 1995; 2005). Where 
diagnostic control is concerned with automatic processes and control-at-a-
distance, interactive control presents opportunities for senior managers to 
become personally involved in the decision making of subordinates (Simons, 
1995). Senior managers discuss performance measures in face to face 
meetings in ways that encourage debate and allow subordinates to challenge 
assumptions and action plans (Simons, 1995). Interactive control thereby 
supports dialogue about strategic uncertainties by reflecting signals sent by 
top managers through their use of performance measures (Simons, 1995; 
Henri, 2006).The interactive use of performance measures therefore 
represents a positive control force which seeks to expand opportunity-seeking 
and learning throughout the organization (Henri, 2006: 5).  
  
There are two interlinking sets of reasons why short-termism can be avoided 
through the use of interactive control. Firstly, interactive control is forward-
looking and is characterised by the continual challenging and debate of 
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underlying data (Simons, 1995; Widener, 2007). Interactive control is 
therefore consistent with double-loop learning through which systems are 
controlled not only through changing actions and but also by revising 
objectives and assumptions (Argyris, 1999; Simons, 1995: 106). Double loop 
learning allows companies to ‘control the long-range effectiveness, and 
hence, the ultimate destiny of the system’ (Argyris, 1999: 69). Double loop 
learning also avoids the embarrassment and threat that can be associated 
with single loop learning (Argyris, 1990: 508; 1999). Interactive control can 
therefore lead to the avoidance of short-termism through double-loop learning 
that promotes a long-term orientation and avoids the defensive behaviour that 
can arise from diagnostic control. 
 
The second reason is based on the claim that managers’ short-termism is 
associated with efforts to optimise current reported results to the detriment of 
strategic activities (Sliwka, 2002). Short-termism has thus become equivalent 
to neglecting strategy; where by definition, short-termism undervalues the 
long-term. Laverty (2004: 951) argues that, ‘in order to avoid undervaluing the 
long-term, firms must create processes that allow and encourage employees 
to understand the opportunities the future presents and how the firm’s 
strategies work to take advantage of those opportunities’. The interactive use 
of performance measures may contribute to such processes. Interactive 
control has a positive effect on the long-term capabilities of innovativeness, 
entrepreneurship, learning and market orientation (Simons, 1995) and may 
consequently give rise to product innovation and encourage new ideas (Bisbe 
and Otley, 2004). The interactive use of performance measures is essential to 
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the learning and adaptation which underpins the development of strategy 
(Abernethy and Brownell, 1999; Simons, 2005). Interactive control therefore 
encourages strategic activities, thereby promoting a long-term orientation. 
Where a long-term orientation is conceived as lying on a continuum and at the 
opposite extreme to short-termism, the interactive use of performance 
measures may be negatively associated with short-termism. 
 
With regard to the choice of performance measures, the use of non-financial 
measures is essential to strategy and encourages firms to undertake 
initiatives that are consistent with long-term strategic objectives (Kaplan and 
Norton, 1996; 2000). Non-financial measures are particularly valuable where 
‘the long-term effect of a strategic task is sufficiently high’ (Sliwka, 2002: 514); 
and non-financial measures discourage managers from ‘stealing from 
tomorrow’ (Hodak, 2005).  These arguments suggest that the interactive use 
of non-financial measures alone will be sufficient to discourage short-termism. 
However, Simons (2005) stresses that it is the interactive use of information 
per se which is important to its strategic effect; and financial and non-financial 
measures can be equally effective in this regard. Indeed, financial measures 
may even support strategic activity (Bhimani and Langfield-Smith, 2007). We 
therefore hypothesise:   
 
H3. Increasing interactive use of financial measures is negatively associated 
with short-termism 
 
H4. Increasing interactive use of non-financial measures is negatively 
associated with short-termism 
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3.3 The joint utilisation of financial and non-financial measures and short-
termism 
Firms are known to use diagnostic and interactive controls jointly rather than 
individually (Simons, 1995; 2005; Henri, 2006; Widener, 2007). The motivation 
behind combining diagnostic and interactive controls is to create the dynamic 
tension between predictable goal achievement and creative innovation which 
is essential to the creation of beneficial effects for the firm (Simons, 1995; 
2000; Lillis, 2002; Marginson, 2002; Henri, 2006). It is therefore important to 
extend the analysis beyond the effects of diagnostic and interactive use of 
financial and performance measures as represented by hypotheses 1-4 to 
consider the combination of diagnostic and interactive controls. Different 
forms of combination are theoretically plausible and both moderating and 
matching forms of fit can be supported in theoretical terms4. 
 
Moderation is a form of fit where the effect of an independent variable X1 on 
the dependent variable Y is conditional on the value of a second independent 
variable X2 and variables X1 and X2 do not influence each other 
(Venkatraman, 1989; Luft and Shields, 2003; Gerdin and Greve, 2004). The 
moderation form of fit is appropriate where claims for the efficacy of combining 
measures are based upon the possibility that short-termism can be avoided 
where interactive control moderates the effect on short-termism that is caused 
by diagnostic control. Six interaction terms result from an analysis of the 
possible combinations of diagnostic and interactive use of financial and non-
financial measures and these are shown in Figure 1. It can be seen from 
Figure 1 that one combination relates entirely to the diagnostic use of 
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performance measures. The diagnostic use of performance measures can be 
associated with short-termism where short-termism is a form of gaming or a 
defensive routine. This argument, which supports hypotheses 1 - 2, gives rise 
to the following hypothesis: 
H5a. Combining (increasing) diagnostic use of financial measures with 
(increasing) diagnostic use of non-financial measures increases short-termism 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Combinations numbered 2 - 5 in Figure 1 combine diagnostic and interactive 
use of financial and non-financial measures in different ways. Combining 
diagnostic and interactive uses leads to dynamic tension that is beneficial to 
the firm (Simons, 1995; Henri, 2006). Henri (2006) draws upon a varied 
literature to argue that dynamic tension encourages dialogue and creativity 
and positively influences the strategic capabilities of market orientation, 
entrepreneurship, innovativeness and organizational learning. It was argued 
earlier that processes that are supportive of strategic activities promote a 
long-term orientation. It follows from this that combining diagnostic and 
interactive control should be negatively associated with short-termism.  
 
H5b. Combining (increasing) diagnostic use of financial or non-financial 
measures with (increasing) interactive use of financial or non-financial 
measures decreases short-termism 
 
The final type of combination presented in Figure 1 relates to the interactive 
use of both financial and non-financial measures. Interactive use is likely to be 
strategic and to avoid defensive behaviour, as argued in the development of 
hypotheses 3 and 4. We therefore present the following hypothesis: 
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H5c. Combining (increasing) interactive use of financial measures with 
(increasing) interactive use of non-financial measures decreases short-
termism 
 
The matching form of fit applies where the theoretically defined relationship 
between independent variables may be established without regard to the 
dependent variable (Venkatraman, 1989). The fit between the independent 
variables should be capable of theoretical elucidation, as in the case of the 
concept of the balanced scorecard where the fit, or balance, between different 
types of financial and non-financial measures is a recognisable construct that 
is independent of the effects on potential dependent variables. The matching 
form of fit can be shown to be relevant to combinations involving both 
diagnostic and interactive controls and financial and non-financial measures.  
 
Taking combinations of diagnostic and interactive controls first, two arguments 
are relevant. Firstly, diagnostic use of performance measurement systems 
‘ensures that the positive effects of interactive use’ can be realised (Henri, 
2006: 537; italics introduced by the authors); and ‘increasing the emphasis on 
one control component increases the benefits received from increasing the 
emphasis on other control components’ (Widener, 2007: 760). If the 
interactive system is to deliver strategic benefits it follows that support must 
be provided through the appropriate level of use of the diagnostic system. The 
second argument is based upon Henri’s (2006: 538) hypothesis that links ‘a 
balanced use’ of diagnostic and interactive use of performance measurement 
systems and positive strategic capabilities. The closer the balance or fit in 
terms of the use of diagnostic and interactive performance measures, then the 
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greater the positive strategic implications. Given that short-termism is 
equivalent to the neglect of strategic activities, two consequences arise from 
these arguments: 1) imbalance can be expected to be less than optimal, and 
may even be dysfunctional, and will occur if the effect of diagnostic use of 
performance measures exceeds the effect of interactive use (and vice versa); 
and 2) given the arguments that supported hypotheses 1 - 4, an imbalance in 
favour of diagnostic vis-à-vis interactive use of performance measures will 
lead to short-termism. These arguments may be applied to both financial and 
non-financial performance measures on the basis that Simons (1995) argues 
that it is the ways in which performance measures are used which is of key 
significance. We hypothesise that: 
 
H6a: Increasing imbalance in favour of diagnostic use over interactive use of 
both financial and non-financial measures is associated with increasing short-
termism 
 
The matching concept of fit also applies in the case of financial versus non-
financial measures. The balance between financial and non-financial 
measures is fundamental to the impact of the balanced scorecard (Kaplan and 
Norton, 1996). In terms of the impact of these measures taken in isolation, 
financial measures reflect past and current activities and have been classified 
as lagging indicators of performance (Kaplan and Norton, 1996; Banker, 
Potter and Srinivasan, 2000; Sliwka, 2002). Non-financial performance 
measures are considered to be leading indicators in the sense that they have 
predictive value for future financial results (Kaplan and Norton 1996; 2000; 
Banker et al., 2000). Firms have been shown to use more non-financial 
measures when they have adopted more long-term orientated strategies (i.e. 
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innovation or prospector types of strategy; Ittner et al., 1997; Said, 
HassabElnaby and Wier, 2003; HassabElnaby, Said and Wier, 2005). In terms 
of the balance or fit between different types of performance measures, non-
financial measures augment financial measures in order to provide a diverse 
set of measures which provide strategic information when presented as a 
combined package (Ittner, Larcker and Randall, 2003). Since combining 
performance measures so as to ensure an appropriate fit between financial 
and non-financial measures supports strategy, and since strategic activity is 
counter to short-termism, it follows that short-termism may result from a failure 
to combine measures in a balanced way. In particular, underweighting non-
financial measures undermines the objectives of the balanced scorecard (Lipe 
and Salterio, 2000); and thus weakens its strategic impact and makes it more 
likely that short-termism will result. An imbalance in favour of financial 
measures may over-emphasise the past and present; and at the extreme it is 
the sole use of financial measures that has traditionally been associated with 
short-termism (e.g. Ittner, Larcker and Meyer, 2003). Given that the balanced 
scorecard can be used either diagnostically or interactively (Simons, 2005: 
142), the following hypothesis can be stated: 
H6b: Increasing imbalance in favour of the use of financial measures over 
non-financial measures for both diagnostic and interactive control is 
associated with increasing short-termism 
 
4. Method 
We tested our hypotheses within the telecommunications industry, drawing 
respondents from Comtel5, a major organization within this globalised 
industry. The study of telecommunications firms is particularly apposite to 
developing our understanding of short-termism because such firms need to 
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sustain a high rate of strategic adaptation and change in order to prosper in 
the long-term and yet face intense competition which endangers their short-
term survival (Dutton, Ashford, O’Neill, Hayes and Wierba, 1997). The use of 
a single firm for the sample is both a strength and a weakness. Single site 
research enables us to focus upon the use of performance measurement 
systems and to assume consistency of factors which may independently affect 
the behaviour of respondents. The factors which remain consistent across the 
present analysis include: organizational size and competencies, performance 
measurement and reward systems, and organizational strategy. The single 
site limits our ability to make claims for generalizability. However, drawing 
respondents from a single organization is not uncommon in the literature. For 
example, Brownell (1981), Hopwood (1972) and Otley (1978) have all drawn 
on single organization settings to examine the use of performance measures. 
 
Data were collected via a questionnaire survey distributed to the senior 
divisional managers of Comtel in the spring/summer of 2006. 284 
questionnaires were distributed electronically and 100 usable responses were 
obtained. The response rate was 35.2%. Non-response bias was assessed on 
the basis of the familiar assumption that non-respondents are more likely to 
be similar to late respondents than early respondents (Fowler, 1993). A two-
sample t-test showed significant differences in mean values for only age 
(p<0.05) and diagnostic use of non-financial measures (p<0.05). Given the 
importance of the latter of these two variables in the study, the analysis was 
also conducted using the separate groups of early versus late respondents. 
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No significantly different results were found compared to the composite group 
of respondents. 
 
Questionnaire instruments were pre-tested and piloted prior to the main study. 
Two of the research team who were not involved in developing the 
questionnaire were asked to assess the questionnaire instruments for 
ambiguity, style of question and length. The revised questionnaire was then 
distributed to MBA students studying in the USA and in New Zealand. 45 
completed questionnaires were returned in total from these two groups. 
Responses were analysed using confirmatory factor analysis, scaling, and 
correlation analysis. Comments made by respondents were also reviewed. 
These processes led to the research instruments being revised. The final 
version of each instrument is described below. 
 
5. Measurement instruments 
Short-termism 
A six-item instrument (reduced to three following principal component factor  
analysis) was devised to capture short-termism (see items 1-6 in the 
Appendix). The six-item instrument contained three questions based upon the 
Marginson and McAulay (2008) instrument that provides a direct measure of 
short-termism as an inter-temporal trade-off and three questions that were 
reverse scored and which sought to represent a long-term orientation. Factor 
analysis results shown in Table 1 reveal a two-factor solution. The three items 
designed to measure short-termism (questions 1 – 3) clearly load onto a 
separate factor. A Cronbach Alpha of 0.68 was obtained for this three-item 
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instrument which was used in the analysis. The measure of long-term 
orientation was included in exploratory analysis but no significant findings 
resulted and the analysis is not presented here. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Diagnostic/interactive use of financial and non-financial measures 
We adopted the instruments used by Henri (2006) to measure respondents’ 
diagnostic and interactive use of financial and non-financial measures, with 
minor changes to wording being introduced after pre- and pilot testing. Two 
separate instruments were developed, each comprising 11 items, with four 
items representing diagnostic use and seven items representing interactive 
use, as shown in the Appendix (items 7 – 17). Two sections of the 
questionnaire were designed to independently assess responses to financial 
and non-financial measures. 
 
We employed confirmatory factor analysis to check the existence of separate 
variables for the diagnostic and interactive use of financial and non-financial 
measures. Principal component factor analysis confirmed the existence of 
separate sub-dimensions of diagnostic and interactive use for the non-
financial instrument, but not for the financial instrument. Table 2 shows that all 
items for the financial instrument load onto a single factor. This may be 
interpreted as suggesting that financial measures were used at Comtel in 
order to combine diagnostic and interactive use in theoretically justifiable 
ways6. We established separate instruments for diagnostic and interactive 
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use of financial and non-financial measures according to theory. Cronbach 
alpha scores were 0.87 or greater (see rows 2-5 of Table 3). Given the results 
of the factor analysis, we also conducted additional analysis using an 
instrument comprising all 11 items for the financial measure. The results of 
this analysis are not presented in the paper, but are available on request. 
They confirm the results of the analysis which is reported. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Diagnostic-interactive and financial-non-financial imbalance measures 
In order to test for the matching concept of fit, variables were created based 
upon the absolute difference between the standardised scores of the original 
variables, using the mean as the basis for standardisation (see Alexander and 
Randolph, 1985; Venkatraman, 1989). The four variables, which are treated 
as new variables that are independent of the variables upon which they are 
based (Alexander and Randolph, 1985),  were paired as follows: 1) the 
difference between diagnostic and interactive use of financial measures was 
paired with 2) the difference between diagnostic and interactive use of non-
financial measures; and 3) the difference between the diagnostic use of 
financial and non-financial measures was paired with 4) the difference 
between the interactive use of financial and non-financial measures. 
Hypothesis 6a relates to (1) and (2) and is concerned with the imbalance 
between diagnostic and interactive use. Hypothesis 6b relates to (3) and (4) 
and is concerned with the imbalance between the use of financial and non-
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financial measures. Cronbach alpha scores are not available because the four 
variables are single item measures.  
 
Control variables 
To reduce the likelihood that demographic characteristics would confound 
responses to short-termism, three characteristics were measured and 
controlled for in the analysis: age, gender, and level of education. These may 
influence managerial beliefs, values, opinions, and actions (Knight, Pearce, 
Smith, Olian, Sims, Smith and Flood, 1999), and may thus influence 
managers’ time horizons. We also controlled for hierarchical level, given 
Jaques’ (1990) argument that hierarchy supports diverse temporal 
orientations, with senior managers providing a long-term orientation.  
 
6. Analysis and results 
Table 3 reports means, standard deviations, Cronbach alphas and Pearson 
correlation coefficients. Tests for multicollinearity among the main effects 
variables revealed, for financial measures, variance inflation factors of 
approximately 2.70 and tolerances of approximately 0.37. For non-financial 
measures, both variance inflation factors and tolerances were well within 
acceptable limits (<2.0 and >0.50 respectively). Overall, test results suggest 
no significant problems in terms of using multiple regression to test 
hypotheses 1 – 4 (Belsley, Kuh and Welsch, 1980). In the case of hypothesis 
6, two approaches were adopted (based upon Alexander and Randolph, 
1985): 1) measures of imbalance were included with the main effects 
variables and 2) measures of imbalance were modelled independently of the 
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main effects variables, giving rise to three models, which: a) include all four 
variables; b) include variables related to imbalance between diagnostic and 
interactive use; and c) include variables related to imbalance between 
financial and non-financial measures. Only in the case of the model containing 
the two variables related to imbalance between diagnostic and interactive use 
(2b) were tests for multicollinearity acceptable (variance inflation factors and 
tolerances were <2.0 and >0.5 respectively). 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
We applied Harman’s single-factor test by conducting confirmatory factor 
analysis using principal component factor analysis involving the main effects 
variables in order to test for the possibility of common response bias 
(Podsakoff, MacKenzie and Lee, 2003). Responses for financial measures 
load onto one instead of two factors, but generally factor loadings for all 
variables examined in this study correspond with their theoretical constructs. 
Neither item misspecification nor cross-loading is a problem.  
 
6.1 Test of hypotheses 
We tested hypotheses 1 – 4 using hierarchical multiple regression analysis 
(Hartmann and Moers, 1999). Three models were developed. The first model 
contains the control variables only. Model 2 adds the measures for diagnostic 
and interactive use of financial measures. Model 3 adds the measures for 
diagnostic and interactive use of non-financial measures. Results are reported 
in Table 4.  
 25
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
The results shown in Table 4 suggest that, whether used diagnostically or 
interactively, increasing use of financial measures may have no effect on 
short-termism. Neither hypothesis 1 nor hypothesis 3 is supported. In contrast, 
the use of non-financial measures both diagnostically and interactively is 
found to be associated with managers’ inter-temporal trade-off choices. The 
greater the importance that is attached to the diagnostic use of non-financial 
measures, the greater managers’ short-termism. Increasing interactive use of 
non-financial measures is negatively associated with short-termism. 
Hypotheses 2 and 4 are therefore supported. 
 
Hypotheses 5a, 5b and 5c predict that interaction terms will be associated 
either positively or negatively with short-termism. All six interaction terms in 
Figure 1 were added to model 3 to produce the first analysis. Each of the 
interaction terms was independently added, in turn, to model 3 as the basis for 
subsequent analysis. For instance, for one analysis, we included a product 
term which represented the joint effect of diagnostic use of financial measures 
and interactive use of non-financial measures (combination 3, Figure 1). None 
of the interaction terms was significant. The hypotheses (5a, 5b, 5c) are not 
supported. 
 
Hypothesis 6a predicts that, for both financial and non-financial measures, an 
imbalance in favour of diagnostic use will lead to short-termism. Table 5 
presents the regression model for these two variables. The results of Table 5 
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suggest that for financial measures, an imbalance in favour of diagnostic use 
is not associated with managers’ inter-temporal trade-off choices. However, 
for non-financial measures, an imbalance in favour of diagnostic use is 
associated with short-termism. H6a is partially supported. 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Hypothesis 6b predicts that, for both diagnostic and interactive use, an 
imbalance in favour of financial measures will lead to short-termism. Table 3 
shows that the correlations between the two imbalance measures are not 
significantly correlated with short-termism. Hypothesis 6b cannot be 
supported. 
 
7. Discussion and Conclusions 
Short-termism was apparent at our research site and one aim in developing 
this study was to explore theoretical explanations and empirical tests to 
account for such behaviour. Our results do not support the enduring orthodoxy 
that financial measures create short-termism, and nor do our results support 
the proposition that using non-financial measures will impact the short-
termism caused by financial measures. Contrary to the proposition that non-
financial measures discourage the short-termism that is associated with 
financial measures (e.g. Ittner and Larcker, 1998; Sliwka, 2002; Merchant and 
Van der Stede, 2007), our findings suggest that it is not financial or non-
financial measures per se which affect short-termism, but the way in which 
performance measures are used. It seems that non-financial measures can 
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create short-termism where they are used diagnostically; whilst the interactive 
use of non-financial measures may be negatively associated with short-
termism. 
 
Our study explored the impact of combinations of diagnostic and interactive 
uses of financial and non-financial measures. Two forms of fit were tested. No 
significant results were found for the moderating effect of non-financial 
measures. This appears to be consistent with Henri’s (2006) finding of no 
overall association between dynamic tension and strategic capabilities. Only 
partial support for the concept of matching was found. As in the case of the 
analysis of the main effects, no association was found between the imbalance 
between the diagnostic and interactive use of financial measures and it was 
only in the case of non-financial measures that an imbalance in favour of 
diagnostic use was associated with short-termism.  
 
The differences between the findings for financial and non-financial measures 
are surprising. If diagnostic use provides an explanation for short-termism, it 
might be expected that the diagnostic use of financial measures would be 
associated with short-termism.  
 
In general, there does not appear to be a compelling reason to explain this 
difference in terms of the characteristics of performance measures. Financial 
measures, such as return on capital employed, may emphasise the short-
term, according to the orthodox view, or may equally be important for strategy 
and a long term orientation (Bhimani and Langfield-Smith, 2007). Financial 
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measures such as the Price Earnings ratio include share price data and may 
drive an external, future, and strategic orientation. In contrast, measures 
relating to costs and current assets, including cost-income ratios, productivity 
ratios, stock turnover and the current ratio, appear to be short-term in 
orientation. Yet, equally, non-financial measures such as customer 
satisfaction or delivery time may encourage either a long-term or a short-term 
orientation. It therefore appears that further work may be needed to consider 
ways in which specific measures are used. For instance, a measure of quality 
used diagnostically may focus attention on the short-term, even where there 
are long-term issues, whilst a measure of new product development, even 
when used diagnostically, may encourage a long-term orientation7. The 
possible consequence is the need for future research to go beyond the 
general categories of financial versus non-financial to consider how specific 
types of performance measures, when used diagnostically, may lead to short-
termism.  
 
An alternative explanation may be found in the argument that short-termism is 
a form of gaming and a defensive response that serves to preserve self-
esteem. Based upon Argyris’ (1999) theory of action, it was argued earlier in 
this paper that short-termism may enable individuals to preserve a positive 
sense of self through the pursuit of actions that subordinates believe send 
messages that superiors wish to receive. The link between short-termism and 
financial measures is therefore premised on the assumption that superiors 
wish to receive messages communicated in financial terms. In some situations 
this may not be the case. For Comtel, for instance, discussions with senior 
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managers revealed that the company: 1) accorded low priority to financial 
targets at the departmental level following experiences consistent with the 
dysfunctional effects outlined in the beyond budgeting literature (see Hope 
and Fraser, 2003); and 2) stressed the importance of non-financial measures 
in pursuit of a policy based upon the principles of beyond budgeting. There 
was therefore little if any motivation at the divisional level for managers to 
maintain self esteem or to act defensively in terms of the financial 
performance measurement system. In contrast, non-financial measures were 
emphasised within the organisation, and so it might be expected that 
departmental managers who were short-termist would be managers for whom 
diagnostic control was important in relation to their use of non-financial 
measures. 
 
The findings presented here are premised on the assumption that the short-
term is defined as a period of one year. Discussion is required on this point 
because, whilst this assumption is consistent with prior studies, it is possible 
that there may be industry level drivers that lead to alternative definitions of 
the short-term8. Time horizons may also vary according to the responsibility 
time span of the role (the time required to complete the longest project/task 
assigned to the role; Jaques, 1990). There is therefore scope to elaborate on 
the nature of managerial time horizons and we explored two possibilities 
through further analysis, based on regression analysis and clustering (Everitt, 
2001). One is that the utilisation of financial and non-financial measures may 
be linked to how managers define the short-term. The other is that definitions 
of what constitute the short-term may underpin the relationship between 
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financial/non-financial measure utilisation and short-termism. We found no 
association between how the short-term is defined and how financial and non-
financial measures are used. In contrast, analysis of definitions of the short-
term based upon time horizons of three, six, twelve and eighteen months 
confirm the main findings but stress the role of a time horizon of < 6 months 
as a basis for the associations between diagnostic and interactive uses of 
non-financial measures and short-termism9. We conclude that future studies 
may benefit from including the time horizons of managers in their analysis. 
 
There is also scope for future studies which build upon our findings in other 
contexts and which address the relationship between the diagnostic and 
interactive utilisation of financial and non-financial measures and short-
termism. Studies where financial measures remain organisationally important 
at the divisional level would be particularly important in testing the proposition 
that short-termism is a form of defensive behaviour that results from the 
support given by diagnostic use to single loop feedback systems. In single site 
contexts where financial measures are balanced by non-financial measures at 
the organisational level we might expect that diagnostic use per se and / or 
imbalance in favour of diagnostic use will lead to short-termism. Alternatively, 
cross sectional studies across firms may reveal that diagnostic use and / or 
imbalance in favour of diagnostic use explain short-termism irrespective of the 
types of measures adopted. Such studies may consider the impact of industry 
type; especially due to a limitation of the present study in pursuing a company 
based within the telecommunications industry, where the prioritisation of non-
financial measures over financial measures may be a feature of the industry 
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due to the impact of regulations that stress the importance of safety and 
customer satisfaction (Ittner et al., 1997). 
 
The research presented here is exploratory and this implies that there are 
limitations that future research can address. First, the generalizability of the 
results is limited by the use of respondents from a single organization. As 
suggested in the previous paragraph, there is a research opportunity to be 
gained from pursuing the hypotheses across a range of companies. Second, 
common method bias may not be totally discounted through the use of 
Harman’s single factor test and remedial strategies are available which may 
be adopted in future studies (see Podsakoff et al., 2003). The third limitation 
relates to the development of Marginson and McAulay’s (2008) measure of 
short-termism. This supports a definition of short-termism that appears to 
provide valuable research potential; but the measure relating to a long-term 
orientation requires further development if there are to be future tests of the 
claims for the long-term orientation that might result from the interactive use of 
either financial or non-financial performance measures. Fourth is the limitation 
that both reverse causality and endogeneity may apply; unobserved variables 
may cause short-termism which in turn causes managers to employ financial 
and non-financial measures in different ways. Fifth, the explanatory power of 
our regression models indicates that there are potentially many other 
variables which we did not examine in our study but which may motivate 
managers to adopt a short-term orientation. In particular, this study did not 
seek to investigate factors such as capital market pressure, reward schemes, 
culture, trust, role ambiguity and social influence, which may explain short-
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termism (Laverty, 1996; 2004; Marginson and McAulay, 2008)10. Likewise, 
this study did not consider the impacts of culture and environmental 
uncertainty that Henri (2006) has shown to be necessary to understanding the 
impacts of the dynamic tension created by the combined use of diagnostic 
and interactive performance measurement systems. 
 
A final limitation is that this paper is consistent with others of its type in 
conflating management control systems and performance measurement 
systems research through the adoption of phrases such as ‘diagnostic use of 
performance measurement systems’ and ‘interactive use of performance 
measurement systems’ (see, for instance, Henri, 2006, for a further example 
of a paper that draws from both management control and performance in this 
way)11. Clearly, management control systems and performance measurement 
systems each have their own traditions and it would not be correct to assume 
that the concepts of control and performance are interchangeable in all 
situations. Indeed, there is a view, expressed recently through, for instance, 
the debates on Sarbanes Oxley, that control is inimical to performance. 
Throughout the paper we were careful to use phrases that suggest that 
performance measures are used in diagnostic and interactive control systems, 
following Simons (1995; 2000; 2005), without seeking to make stronger 
assertions regarding the underlying relationships. Equally, whilst we draw 
upon the concepts of single loop and double loop feedback, which are 
particular forms of control, we do not wish to suggest that other forms of 
control are not important. Additional theoretical elaboration and clarification is 
necessary. A variety of papers provide relevant reviews which provide a 
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starting point for such work. For instance, for reviews of the management 
control systems literature see Langfield-Smith (1997) and Chenhall (2003). 
For a review that addresses the enabling and constraining roles of 
performance measurement systems, see Wouters and Wilderom (2008). 
 
Notwithstanding these limitations, our findings complement recent 
contributions which have begun to reassess the value of non-financial 
performance measurement systems. The balanced scorecard philosophy in 
particular has spurred interest in the notion of combining leading and lagging 
performance indicators to optimise firm performance over the longer-term 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1996; 2000). These claims assume that non-financial 
measures create effects that are different to, and overcome the limitations 
associated with, the sole use of financial measures. However, recent literature 
has begun to question this assumption. For example, Lau and Sholihin (2005) 
found no differences between financial and non-financial measures for the 
behavioural consequences of performance measurement systems. In a 
second example, Ittner, Larcker and Meyer (2003) report a case study based 
upon a balanced scorecard based reward system, which is claimed by Kaplan 
and Norton (2001) to have positive effects, and describe how the system was 
ultimately abandoned. Our findings complement this emerging body of 
research by highlighting the need to consider the ways in which performance 
measures are used in addition to the impact of the measures per se.  
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1 The literature appears to imply that disposition results from the influence of capital markets 
or performance measurement systems. These influence behaviour irrespective of 
predisposition. There is some evidence to suggest that this need not necessarily be the case. 
For instance, Hofstede (2001: 361) suggests that in ‘short-term orientated cultures the 
‘bottom-line’ ... is a major concern; control systems are focused on it and managers are 
constantly judged by it’, and that culture predisposes individuals to be short-termist. 
Performance measurement systems may therefore represent a moderating variable that 
amplifies existing predispositions. 
2 Otley defined two groups of managers, designated B and C based upon the ranking of two 
questionnaire items: ‘how well I meet my budget’ and ‘how efficiently I run my unit’. Managers 
in both groups ranked both items among their top three performance criteria and thus 
maintained a balance between budget and efficiency criteria.  
3 The object of Gibbs et al (2004) study was the determinants of subjectivity in incentives. The 
authors expected to find that the short-term focus of quantitative measures would lead to the 
use of subjectivity in determining levels of reward but found a negative relationship contrary to 
expectations. In contrast, for the measure of short-termism based upon the proxy of long term 
investments in intangibles, a positive relationship was reported consistent with expectations. 
4 The third kind of fit which is widely adopted is mediation. Mediation is inappropriate in this 
case because there must be a causal relationship between the independent variables for 
mediation to be appropriate (Gerdin and Greve, 2004). There is no argument in the literature 
to suggest that any type of use of financial measures gives rise in causal terms to any type of 
use of non-financial measures. 
5 A fictitious name is used to respect confidentiality. 
6 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this possibility. The implication is that the 
level of dynamic tension or balance between diagnostic and interactive uses of financial 
measures gave rise to a single factor. 
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presented throughout this paragraph. 
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9 Details are available on request. 
10 We examined role ambiguity as a potential determinant of short-termism. Our findings 
support those of Marginson and McAulay (2008), who found increasing role ambiguity to be 
associated with increasing short-termism. Results are not reported in this paper but are 
available on request. 
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Appendix  
 
Inter-temporal trade-off 
 
The questionnaire contained a number of sections addressing a broad research agenda 
based upon the management control systems and performance measurement systems 
literatures. One of the sections asked managers to provide a variety of responses to 
specific issues including but not restricted to short-termism. Questions were listed 
randomly and the questions below were interspersed with other questions. The 
numbering given below assists referencing in the main body of the text of the article 
and is not intended to give an indication of the structure of the questionnaire. 
 
Rubric on the questionnaire 
 
The following statements describe how people may feel about their work situation. 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each item using the 
following scale: Scale: 1 (Strongly agree) – 5 (Strongly disagree) 
 
1. I prefer to sacrifice long-term benefits in order to achieve short-term performance 
targets 
 
2. I believe that short-term results should be achieved, even if this means forgoing 
long-term pay-offs 
 
3. I am willing to sacrifice long-term performance in order to achieve short-term 
results 
 
4. In trade off situations, I prefer to sacrifice short-term results for expected long-term 
payoffs  
 
5. I prefer to deviate from financial targets where this leads to innovations which are 
likely to be  beneficial in the long-term 
 
6. I concentrate my attention on issues which will impact my targets beyond the next 
18 months 
 
Note: Items 4, 5 and 6 were reverse scored.  
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Financial targets and non-financial performance measures 
 
The questionnaire contained separate sections for responses to financial and non-
financial measures and included statements within each section that related to 
diagnostic and interactive use. The use of the terms “diagnostic” and “interactive” 
were omitted from the questionnaire and the items below were listed randomly. The 
use of the term “targets” replaced the term “performance measures” from the original 
version of the questionnaire following discussions with the firm in question. The 
rubric below provides the framework for each of the two sections. The numbering 
given below assists referencing in the main body of the text of the article and is not 
intended to give an indication of the structure of the questionnaire. Table 2 follows the 
ordering of the items within the questionnaire. 
 
Rubric on the questionnaire 
 
The statements below relate to financial (non-financial) targets. Using the scale shown 
below, please rate the extent to which you currently use financial (non-financial) 
targets: Scale: 1 (not at all) – 5 (to a great extent). 
 
Diagnostic use 
 
7. Track progress towards goals 
8. Monitor results 
9. Compare outcomes to expectations 
10. Review key measures 
 
Interactive use 
 
11. Encourage discussions in meetings* 
12. Encourage continual challenge and debate of underlying data, assumptions and 
action plans 
13. Provide a common view of the organization 
14. Tie the organization together 
15. Enable your area to focus on common issues* 
16. Develop a common vocabulary in your area* 
17. Enable your area to focus on critical success factors* 
 
*The wording of these statements was adapted to fit the firm in question. 
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Figure 1: Interaction terms for combinations of diagnostic and / or interactive 
use of financial and non-financial measures which increase short-termism 
(combination 1) or which decrease short-termism (combinations 2 – 6) 
 
 
Type of combination 
 
 
Description 
H5a. Combining (increasing) diagnostic use of 
financial measures with (increasing) diagnostic use 
of non-financial measures increases short-termism 
 
1. Diagnostic use Diagnostic use of financial 
measures x diagnostic use of 
non-financial measures 
H5b. Combining (increasing) diagnostic use of 
financial or non-financial measures with 
(increasing) interactive use of financial or non-
financial measures decreases short-termism 
 
2. Diagnostic combined with interactive use Diagnostic use of financial 
measures x interactive use of 
financial measures 
3. Diagnostic combined with interactive use Diagnostic use of financial 
measures x interactive use of 
non-financial measures 
4. Diagnostic combined with interactive use Diagnostic use of non-
financial measures x 
interactive use of financial 
measures 
5. Diagnostic combined with interactive use Diagnostic use of non-
financial measures x 
interactive use of non-
financial measures 
H5c. Combining (increasing) interactive use of 
financial measures with (increasing) interactive use 
of non-financial measures decreases short-termism 
 
6. Interactive use Interactive use of financial 
measures x interactive use of 
non-financial measures 
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Table 1: Factor analysis results for short-term trade-off 
 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Communalities 
Item 1a 0.779 -0.095 0.616 
Item 2 0.802 -0.120 0.657 
Item 3 0.694  0.284 0.629 
Item 4 0.494  0.307 0.339 
Item 5 0.004  0.771 0.596 
Item 6 0.008  0.680 0.462 
Eigen values 1.977  1.321  
Explained variance 34.74% 20.23%  
 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of sampling adequacy = 0.647 
 
aItems 1 – 6 are presented in the appendix. 
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Table 2: Factor analysis results for financial and non-financial instruments 
 
 Factor 1 Factor 
2 
Factor 3 Commun-
alities 
FD Track progress towards goals  0.885 -0.049  0.099 0.796 
FI Encourage discussions  0.859  0.068  0.004 0.743 
FD Monitor results  0.885 -0.159  0.195 0.847 
FD Compare outcomes to experience  0.906 -0.029  0.131 0.838 
FI Encourage continual challenge  0.835  0.230  0.023 0.750 
FI Provide a common view  0.830  0.168 -0.145 0.738 
FD Review key measures  0.870 -0.029  0.140 0.777 
FI Tie the organization together  0.797  0.170 -0.094 0.673 
FI Focus on common issues  0.874  0.038  0.034 0.766 
FI Develop common vocabulary  0.846  0.034 -0.073 0.721 
FI Focus on critical success factors  0.841  0.002  0.137 0.726 
NFD Track progress toward goals  0.115  0.412  0.711 0.689 
NFI Encourage discussions  0.020  0.764  0.362 0.715 
NFI Develop common vocabulary  0.097  0.784  0.254 0.688 
NFD Monitor results  0.006  0.405  0.660 0.643 
NFI Provide a common view  0.075  0.796  0.074 0.645 
NFI Tie the organization together  0.189  0.771  0.095 0.640 
NFD Compare outcomes to experience  0.058  0.371  0.781 0.752 
NFI Encourage continual challenge -0008  0.768  0.236 0.646 
NFD Review key measures  0.082  0.316  0.786 0.724 
NFI Focus on common issues -0.060  0.783  0.255 0.682 
NFI Focus on critical success factors -0.055  0.797  0.361 0.768 
Eigen values  8.55  6.11  1.31  
Explained variance 37.14% 22.85% 12.60%  
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of sampling adequacy = 0.884 
 
FD = Financial diagnostic 
FI = Financial interactive 
NFD = Non-financial diagnostic 
NFI = Non-financial interactive 
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Table 3: 
Descriptive statistics, including Pearson correlation coefficients 
 
Variable Mean SD CA Theo Act 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. ST 11.12 1.90 0.68 3-15 6-15  -         
2. FD 14.79 4.36 0.95 4-20 4-20  0.07  -        
3. FI 20.22 6.28 0.94 5-30 5-30  0.09  0.86  -       
4. NFD 15.96 2.72 0.87 4-20 6-20  0.03  0.17  0.13  -      
5. NFI 23.84 4.11 0.90 6-30 9-30  0.27  0.08  0.16  0.66  -     
6. D-I F   0.32 0.59 n/a -4-+4 -2.1-+1.83 -0.03  0.35 -0.20  0.05 -0.15 -    
7. D-I NF   0.02 0.56 n/a -4-+4 -2.0-+1.67 -0.35 -0.02  0.04  0.15  0.75  0.25 -   
8. D F-NF  -0.29 1.19 n/a -4-+4 -3.8-+1.82  0.08  0.83  0.70 -0.43 -0.32  0.29 -0.14 -  
9. I F-NF  -0.60 1.16 n/a -4-+4 -4.0-+2.00 -0.07  0.72  0.81 -0.28 -0.45 -0.09  0.22 0.82 - 
 
SD =       Standard deviation  
CA =       Cronbach Alpha 
Theo =       Theoretical range 
Act =       Actual range 
ST =       Short-termism 
FD =       Diagnostic use of financial measures 
FI =       Interactive use of financial measures 
NFD =       Diagnostic use of non-financial measures 
NFI =       Interactive use of non-financial measures 
D-I F =      Net difference between diagnostic vis-à-vis interactive utilisation of financial measures 
D-I NF =   Net difference between diagnostic vis-à-vis interactive utilisation of non-financial measures 
D F-NF =  Net difference between diagnostic utilisation of financial vis-à-vis non-financial measures  
I F-NF =   Net difference between interactive utilisation of financial vis-à-vis non-financial measures  
 
Correlations above 0.19 significant at p < 0.05 
 
 
Table 4: 
 
Predictor variables regressed on short-termism 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Control variables: 
Age 
Gender 
Education 
Hierarchical level 
 
 
 
 0.092 
 0.094 
-0.089 
-0.028 
 
 
 0.107 
 0.082 
-0.082 
-0.040 
 
 
 0.036 
 0.072 
-0.051 
-0.010 
 
Financial measures: 
Diagnostic use (-ve)a 
Interactive use (+ve) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.121 
 0.190 
 
 
 0.064 
 0.017 
 
Non-financial 
measures: 
Diagnostic use (-ve) 
Interactive use (+ve) 
 
   
 
 
-0.378** 
 0.509*** 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
 
 0.010 
 
 0.046 
 
 0.103*** 
 
Incremental Adj. R2 
 
  
 0.036 
 
 0.057** 
 
 
*p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Standardised regression coefficients reported 
 
aThe predicted signs reflect the polarity of the dependent variable, for which a low 
score = trade-off in favour of the short-term. An increasing emphasis on the use of, 
diagnostic and interactive measures, is represented by a higher score. Thus, we would 
expect to find a significant negative relationship between increasing diagnostic 
control and short-termism, and a significant positive relationship for increasing 
interactive control and short-termism.
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Table 5:  
 
Results for regression models based upon the matching concept of fit, 
short-termism as the dependent variable 
 
Variable Standardised 
regression coefficient 
t-statistic 
 
Diagnostic – Interactive 
imbalance: financial measures 
 
 
 0.045 
 
 0.590 
 
Diagnostic – Interactive 
imbalance: non-financial 
measures 
 
 
-0.352 
  
-3.501*** 
 
Adjusted R2 = 0.108** 
 
  
 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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